Global geopolitics will be noisy next year, with Ukraine-Russia and the Middle East likely to still dominate the headlines. The outcomes for the ongoing conflict in those two parts of the world are still highly uncertain, but 2024 could be the year where their respective trajectories are determined. Ukraine faces potential fatigue and distraction with its key Western supporters, and while there is little appetite among the key Middle East players in seeing significantly greater instability, the sheer complexity of the issues and the depth of grievances make the pursuit of peace challenging. Meanwhile, the US faces an election in November 2024 that could cause it to become more isolationist, further reducing its engagement with Asia (again).

In our part of the world, the perceived flashpoints are primarily Taiwan and the South China Sea, where the fear is that a miscalculation in the regular posturing between regional powers could result in an actual shooting war. However, the risk of war in East Asia — especially in the context of it happening in 2024 or even 2025 — is lower than commonly portrayed in media (or worse, social media). This does not preclude a limited skirmish maybe from Philippine and Chinese naval forces continuing their one-upmanship, or due to a collision in the air as Western and Chinese air forces shadow each other. However, both Washington and Beijing have difficult domestic issues to deal with, whether it be the upcoming US elections or the worrisome weaknesses in the Chinese economy. And while posturing on global issues makes for good domestic headlines and distractions for their respective leaders and elites, the costs of an actual war would be staggering. It could make the economic hit from the pandemic look like a mild recession and become a political ravine for the leaders of both countries.

El Niño brings the threat of more unpredictable weather in 2024. Already, Thailand is expecting drier conditions that could reduce its rice and sugar production, which will be directly transmitted to domestic Philippine prices for these commodities. Meanwhile, India, the world’s largest rice exporter, faces an election year and would like to avoid a problematic spike in food prices by assuring its domestic supplies, while Indonesia could decide to import more ahead of its own polls. Indonesia and Malaysia are preparing for the possibility of palm oil supply dropping. The first half of the year therefore promises to be an unsettled one for some of the region’s major agricultural commodities.

Aside from the problems that a serious El Niño might cause for inflation and food, the real risks are at the country level or are issue-specific, and in political short-termism. Indonesia, the largest of ASEAN’s countries in economic size and population, will have its most consequential elections on Feb. 14 since the fall of Suharto in the 1990s, with a possible runoff in June. Leading the race is the retired general, defense minister Prabowo Subianto of the Gerindra party, a known nationalist and statist who frequently rails against what he describes as the historical exploitation of Indonesia by foreigners and neo-liberals — rhetoric that is a reversal of the moderate views expounded by his predecessors over the past two decades.

His image has been tempered somewhat by his uncontroversial stint in President Joko Widodo’s cabinet, and the fragmented nature of Indonesian politics makes it likely that he will need a couple of years to consolidate political power before potentially doing real damage. But should an unreformed and unrepentant Prabowo eventually emerge, then investor and economic uncertainty could increase not only about Indonesia’s openness to foreign investment, but the possibility that inefficient and value-destroying state enterprises could take on greater roles in the economy.

Thailand had its elections only this year, but the outcome left a lot to be desired in terms of entrenching political stability. The For Thais (PT) party of Thaksin Shinawatra was able to have Srettha Thavisin elected prime minister only after the deadlock between conservatives and the now opposition Move Forward Party. But Srettha’s ability to push PT’s agenda is still unproven and if Thailand’s economy flounders into next year, then the ruling party could decide to elevate Thakin’s youngest daughter, Paetongtarn, to the PM position to avoid a further slide in its popularity. The conservative Thai senate also loses its ability to vote for a prime minister next year, and how the opaque political maneuvering could eventually manifest in politics adds to the uncertainty. However, PT’s efforts to entrench its control over Thai politics, whether in Srettha or Paetongtarn, raises expectations of populist economic policies and of Thailand being unable to achieve the political stability and policy coordination that had established it as a key investment destination in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile, Vietnam’s Communist Party (CPV) is not ridden by factional infighting and is still two years away from an important leadership transition. However, the economy is facing the after-effects of CPV general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s “blazing furnace” anti-corruption campaign, which has generated substantial uncertainty for government officials and businesses wary of being investigated and prosecuted by an opaque political and judicial system. However, the CPV likely considers anti-corruption in the banking sector and state enterprises as a key to maintaining the legitimacy of single-party rule and avoiding systemic financial risk, which means that it would be willing to continue accepting slower growth as long as broader macroeconomic and social stability is maintained. Expect jostling for control of the CPV to increase later in the year, however.

And then there is Myanmar, where the junta’s ability to control large swathes of its territory is now in doubt, even though the underground political opposition and ethnic armed organizations may still be insufficiently consolidated to directly threaten Naypyidaw. However, the decline in governance capabilities and the dire economic and security conditions mean increased suffering for its people, and from which ASEAN may increasingly be less able to divert its attention. More humanitarian aid may be needed, as well as greater pressure on the obdurate generals to agree to a real political solution.

Last, and probably the least, in terms of event risks are the Philippines and Malaysia. There will be much noise about the potential falling out between the Marcoses and Dutertes, but this is unlikely to threaten the president unless the administration effectively loses control of congress. The real risk for the Philippines is of weak coordination by the executive, with foreign investors continuing to find only ad-hoc policymaking, limited reforms, uncooperative bureaucracies, and an inability to effectively implement policies in education and infrastructure development that make it a more competitive economy. In Kuala Lumpur, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim survived the major state elections this year and while there will be persistent coverage in how his Alliance of Hope (PH) coalition appears to be losing ground to the opposition National Alliance (PN) and the Malaysian Islamic Party, he appears to be at least secure for the next few years. Reform expectations are already low, but Anwar at least has the opportunity to be the first PM to hold office for more than two years since the end of the National Front (BN)-led government in 2018. This may be a small but notable achievement in a region where short-term politics among the larger countries and economies is likely to be the rule more than the exception in 2024.

Bob Herrera-Lim is a managing director at Teneo, a New-York based consulting firm that advises companies and investors globally. He covers all of Southeast Asia for the firm’s clients. He is also a fellow of the Foundation for Economic Freedom.