Philippine politics will, over the next few weeks, gradually transition from the political battle between the administration and Vice-President Sara Duterte to the May 2025 midterm elections — which is also a mini-proxy war between the two sides for senate seats, but it is less pronounced and virulent. Expectations of better governance from the midterms are low, since candidates win based on popularity and political machinery, not platforms, programs, or party ideologies.

The administration will have to again cobble together majority coalitions in the house and senate after the vote because we lack an effective party system. Much of what happens after May is therefore still up in the air, because the post-election environment will not be about fulfilling election promises but in dispensing patronage, bargaining for choice committees and privileges, and positioning for the 2028 elections. Meanwhile, the outcome of the senate elections could lead to some early handicapping of prospective presidential candidates, although previous election cycles have proven that three years out from the next presidential vote is generally “too early to tell” in terms of the likely winner.

Several other countries in the region will be interesting to watch. Often, we focus too much on our country, neglecting how our neighbors have undergone, or are undergoing, the same challenges. Their experiences could serve as either examples or cautionary tales, or sometimes even both, over time.

Arguably the most interesting country to watch will be Vietnam. Its export-led industrialization drive has attracted attention globally, and specifically as it built its credibility as a destination for electronics and semiconductor manufacturing. But what could be interesting next year is the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) plan to “right-size” the government by cutting the number of ministries and reducing tens, or even hundreds of thousands, of government jobs. It would be the most radical restructuring of the political system in decades. CPV general secretary To Lam wants to raise the economic growth rate but believes that the parallel power structure where the “party leads, but the state manages” has created inefficiencies because overlapping roles, contradictory decision-making, and second-guessing by bureaucrats of the CPV’s intent. His goal is to simplify the governance structure to make it easier for foreign investors. If successful (and that is still a significant “if”), it could measurably raise the long-term growth outlook for Vietnam.

Decades ago, we considered Thailand to be our peer, until it left us behind sometime in the 1990s or early 2000s. The fear of many Filipinos is that Vietnam might at some point similarly overtake us. We now aspire to win some of the investment that Vietnam has successfully attracted in manufacturing. It is a common anecdote that Vietnamese agricultural scientists and bureaucrats traveled to the Philippines decades ago to learn how to improve their agriculture and rice production. Now, the shoe is on the other foot. We will have to start learning from Vietnam if we really want to build an industrial manufacturing base.

Myanmar is also high on the list. The internal conflict since the 2021 coup has led to thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands displaced internally (or over the border in neighboring countries), and an economic crisis. The generals in control in Yangon have a plan to call elections early next year, but its legitimacy will be challenged because election rules approved in 2023 make it less than free and fair. Some Philippine companies are invested in Myanmar. But our interest in what happens there is not so much economic, but in the functioning of ASEAN when it has to deal with serious instability and suffering in one of its member countries because of political strife.

After the Asian financial crisis almost three decades ago, ASEAN increased its cooperation to deal with future economic crises. However, ASEAN’s individual countries believe in the policy of non-interference in each other’s domestic political affairs, which is why the region is divided over how much pressure to impose on the junta — which makes the current scale of suffering and violence a test for the regional grouping and for our own foreign policy. In the meantime, the generals’ goal of seeking legitimacy for the planned elections could cause them to seek political cover from Beijing and Moscow, turning Southeast Asia’s western side into another geopolitical battleground.

Indonesia will see the first full year of Prabowo Subianto as president. His previous political campaigns had generated apprehension because of his perceived nationalist and populist tendencies, as well as tendency to disparage democratic processes. But his uncontroversial stint as defense minister and promise that he would continue with many of the policies of his predecessor, President Joko Widodo, have tempered these fears. Prabowo’s decision to reappoint several of Widodo’s cabinet ministers, including the widely respected finance minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati, has reinforced the notion that he is a more moderate politician today, compared to the firebrand of the previous decade. Next year could prove if that assessment is true, and whether his alliance with former president Widodo will hold.

Among Prabowo’s promises is a national program to provide mothers and school age children with free nutritious meals, with the goal of reducing stunting. It is an expensive effort, which could run up to $28 billion annually. With a budget of about $1 or slightly more per day per beneficiary, Indonesia aims to provide vegetables, rice, milk, and a protein to around 82 million recipients within five years. We have a similar — if not worse — problem of childhood stunting and could look to Indonesia’s efforts to find ways to implement a national program consistently.

Indonesia is also attempting to insert itself into the global value chain for electric vehicles, particularly in battery production with its abundant mineral resources. We have smaller reserves than Indonesia in nickel and copper, but they may be of sufficient scale for us to be similarly considered as an alternative supplier. But integrating ourselves into these supply chains will also mean improving a lot of our domestic infrastructure and designing policies to encourage investment in these sectors.

It will, in short, require us to evolve industrial policy, for us to be able to win investments for the production of batteries, semiconductors, and electronics. But that is the way large segments of the world are now evolving, and it is the future we face.

Bob Herrera-Lim is a managing director at Teneo, a New-York based consulting firm that advises companies and investors globally. He covers all of Southeast Asia for the firm’s clients. He is also a fellow of the Foundation for Economic Freedom.