The theme of the Management Association of the Philippines (MAP) for 2018 is “Competing in the Age of Disruption.” Disruption will come from advancement in technology, innovation in business models, borderless competition, climate change, and new dynamics in geopolitics.
In the security arena, this theme becomes even more relevant with the declaration of the President classifying the CPP/NPA as a terror group. This pronouncement validates the existence of the movement’s sinister plot to wreak further damage on the political and economic environment by creating an atmosphere of fear and terror. The latest offensive action of the movement has taken a toll on businessmen operating in far-flung areas, even as they continue to exploit socioeconomic issues to discredit the government.
The year 2018 shows no sign of disengagement nor reduction of offensive action on the part of the CPP/NPA. It can be considered as one of the factors that will derail and frustrate the institutionalization of a positive business climate. To provide more clarity and insight, this article presents the basic dynamics of insurgency wars. It is best to have a working knowledge of the insurgency problem and how it affects a competitive business environment.
WHAT IS AN INSURGENCY?
Insurgencies are politico-military organizations or movements attempting to seize full or partial control of a country’s territory/resources through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political underground organizations. While insurgencies may use terrorism as one of their methods, they are not purely terrorist organizations which do not aim to control a territory.
Insurgencies also use armed force to achieve political objectives, namely, (1) destroy the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the local populace and the global village; and (2) reduce or neutralize the acceptability and credibility of government security forces, while at the same time increasing the legitimacy of their own illegal, irregular organization, both locally and abroad.
Insurgencies generally follow four (4) stages of development: pre-insurgency, organizational phase, guerrilla warfare, and mobile conventional warfare.
In guerrilla warfare, the insurgency begins with scattered military hit-and-run operations against security forces, while conducting mass organizing work among the people. At the initial stage, governments usually respond with focused military operations, counter-propaganda, and amnesty offers to break the insurgent manpower. In the last phase, the insurgency’s forces reach a point where they can directly confront the military in conventional battles. Few insurgencies ever reach this stage.
TYPES OF INSURGENCIES
An insurgency’s category is most influenced by its operational environment: the geographic, sociocultural, political, and economic conditions of the area. Usually less influential are its leaders’ ideology and training as the insurgency must adapt to its environment to survive.
• Politically organized insurgencies: These insurgencies put political organization first before military action. They create a sophisticated political structure of their own to administer controlled territories with the hope of eventually replacing the government. They are vulnerable to efforts to neutralize their political structure and tend towards excessive adherence to political ideology.
• Militarily-organized insurgencies: These prioritize military action over political organization. They hope that the general public views their attacks as an expression of their own anger against the government. They are vulnerable to government military operations during the early stages of their insurgency and often lack the covert networks among the civilian populace compared to politically organized insurgencies.
INDICATORS OF DEVELOPING INSURGENCIES
Budding insurgent threats are usually characterized by an increase in foreign assistance, increasing acquisition of war materiel, training of members, and the development of a politico-military organization to attract new members.
Key indicators include evidence of funds, training, and materiel provided by foreign insurgents and even foreign governments seeking to depose the government. Among the general public, key indicators include legitimate organizations building ties with the insurgents, an increase in sympathetic attitudes towards them, and indications that the insurgency is becoming concerned with its reputation in the media.
On the armed front, indicators include the targeting of key government installations and other symbolic sites, overzealous support for land reform, targeting of foreign properties, assassinations, movement of armed men in rural areas, distribution of radical propaganda, and infiltration into the government sector.
DETERMINANTS OF CONTROL IN AN INSURGENCY
Who has control over an area, whether the insurgents or the government, primarily depends on who can muster most of the popular support. There are three (3) factors that are crucial to establishing this control: attitudes, organization, and security. Attitudes refer to the receptivity of the local populace to government/insurgency propaganda. Organization refers to the capability of the government/insurgents to organize among the local populace, provide them with tangible benefits, collect taxes, recruit from them, and implement their policies. Security refers to the government/insurgent capability to protect its leaders, troops, and the local populace from enemy attack. Lack of security leads to a breakdown in troop morale and support from the locals.
LATE-STAGE INDICATORS OF SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCIES
Successful insurgencies follow a common pattern that precedes the defeat of the government, namely, the government loses foreign and domestic support while it loses territory and the security forces weaken. Foreign government allies withdraw their support while foreign organizations increase their support towards the insurgents. Locally, the general public views the government as illegitimate while the insurgents as justified and righteous in their cause. The government begins losing territory one-by-one and national economic activity is severely disrupted. The security forces begin to lose morale, are unable to protect government assets and perform successful operations, and may even attempt a coup. Finally, the government may even seriously consider sharing power with the rebels just to survive.
CORPORATE RESOLVE AND RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
The insurgent movement has developed a leadership of impunity and convenience.
A number of business establishments located and operating in insurgent bailiwicks have long coexisted with them by wilfully contributing to their revolutionary tax. The magnitude is large. To countenance its continuity for the sake of survival is a form of treachery to the nation. President Rodrigo Roa Duterte has categorically stated that this must stop. Top corporate leaders must manifest a firm resolve to sever this relationship.
According to Mao Tse-Tung, communists exist because of popular support from common folks in communities. They are the water that sustains the fishes. As long as that water exists, the movement continues to be fed and nurtured. Following this argument, the corporate groups can channel the funds allocated for revolutionary tax in the form of projects and programs related to CSR, such as livelihood, social amelioration, education and training, etc. A multiplier can be created if they partner with the government agencies.
The businessman’s role in negating disruption through terror and fear is no easy task. Compromise for the sake of business survival is a clumsy excuse. The more space you give to insurgents, the more you are deprived of the opportunity to grow and develop.
Lt. Gen. Jaime S. de los Santos (Ret) is a member of the MAP National Issues Committee, former Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and Force Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force in East Timor, and Trustee of the UP Foundation.
jaime_dlsantos@yahoo.com
jimmydlsantos@gmail.com
map@map.org.ph
http://map.org.ph
