Coordinating rhetoric and practices in the West Philippine Sea

The Philippines under the Duterte Administration should construct a narrative in order to make sense of its position in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).
This machinery has to formally bridge the chief executive’s rhetoric, and the words and actions of Philippine defense and military officials. Practices and speeches are no different from each other because they provide meanings and structure understandings. Thus, texts and actions that pertain to the WPS, whether at higher levels or on the ground should be able to explain and underpin the government’s perceptions, perspectives, interpretation of the what is threatening and its response to it.
Securitization theories are useful as they seek to answer the following questions: How do actors respond to a security threat? What do actors do in order to beef up maritime security?
From a securitization perspective, political elites such as chief leaders and executives securitize by transforming an (any) issue into security agenda through emergency measures, authoritative speeches, declarations and national addresses that heads of states make in order to “lift” an issue from the political to the security realm.
On the other hand, practice-based securitization focus on actions and practices of technical and bureaucratic experts who work with agencies on the ground. In the field of maritime security, these practices include surveillance, maritime domain awareness, border patrol and joint exercises, among others.
There is an apparent gap between President Rodrigo Duterte’s and Secretary Allan Cayetano’s rhetoric and the practices that take place at the level of the offices of National Defense and the Armed Forces. The gap stems from when the President issues comments that the Philippines will go to war with China or carelessly jokes that it will secede to be part of China’s province. The imperative directed at the political communication offices is to bridge this gap of meaning and coherence. Acts, plans, and practices that the military and defense actors undertake in the contested islands should form part of the official narrative on the WPS in the context of the asymmetric power relationship with China.
A brief survey of written media sources reveal groups of practices that may be categorized in terms of air surveillance, joint patrol/military exercises and rehabilitation of outposts and runways in the WPS. These are all aimed at strengthening the Philippines’ ability to develop an awareness of the operating maritime and air spaces.
In 2016, there were talks of the Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAAP) installation of a flight tracking system on Pag-asa island that will improve satellite-based detection of aircrafts. This specific plan has been followed up by the installation of communications, navigation, surveillance and air traffic management (CNS/ATM)systems that seeks to improve air identification of “100% of the Philippine air space.”
The initiative, bared on January 2016 was said to be part of a larger Pag-asa island surveillance system that was intended to track mainly commercial flights. Additionally, this is particularly relevant given that there are multiple flights over Pagasa island’s airspace.
CAAP’s initiative is supposed to enhance our airspace surveillance capability which in 2016 was based on a few operating radars. The government-approved JICA- financed CNS/ATM Systems are targeted at building radar facilities as a means to improve the ‘surveillance coverage’ of Philippine airspace.

A second category of practices that the Duterte government needs to build on are the patrol and military exercises with other countries. Joint patrols help improve naval capabilities in surveillance, intelligence exchange, and law enforcement.
Recently, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia launched a post-Marawi crisis coordinated trilateral patrols in the Sulu-Sulawesi waters as the government’s response not only to terrorist threats but to the continuing threats of piracy, armed robbery, illegal arms and drugs trade, and human trafficking. The Sulu Sea Patrol Initiative has resulted in the institution of monitoring stations and of transit corridors under the management of the triborder states.
A third set of practices relates to a March 2018 news on the acquisition and arrival of three TC 90s from the Japan Ministry of Defense. These better-equipped equipment is expected to boost Philippine military presence through the aerial patrol of Panatag and Scarborough shoals.
Naval Public Affairs Office Captain Lued Lincuna said that these aircraft will help establish maritime domain and situational awareness in the WPS. Newly acquired TC90 aircrafts which make up the initial batch of aircrafts that former President Benigno S. C. Aquino III entered with Japan under a lease arrangement, have been used by the Japanese and Philippine navies in joint patrol exercises in the West Philippine Sea in early 2018.
Last year, the Philippine Navy announced the delivery of construction materials in Pag-asa Island.
Considered part of the targeted rehabilitation measures of outposts in the WPS, the construction is supposed to increase the number of landings in Panatag island, deliver food supplies to military and civilian constituents, and provide fishing shelter for fishers. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said in January 2018 that the proposed construction of a beach ramp in Panatag island will aid the delivery of the construction supplies.
It is interesting to note that both Philippine defense and naval officials have de-conflicted their messages and actions as regards the Panatag island rehabilitation. These moves affirm that despite the ‘symbolic’ value of the Philippines’ presence in Panatag and Thitu islands, the practices of military and defense actors on the ground reflect a strategy consistent with Philippine sovereignty in the WPS. The same actors, Secretary Lorenzana and former Chief of Staff General Eduardo Año’s pursued symbolic politics when they visited Thitu islands while carried by a Philippine Airforce C130 transport plane. Both officials undertook flag raising in the contested Thitu island on April 2017.
The Duterte government should construct a coherent policy that communicates to external and internal stakeholders its twin strategy of diplomatic restraint and economic collaboration with China while it pursues activities (and it should fund these activities) that are aimed at strengthening maritime security through joint patrols, aerial and maritime domain awareness, intelligence and surveillance capability.
This narrative should be directed at de-conflicting the sovereignty-lined concerns in the WPS. This will mean articulating alternative scripts and at the same demonstrate resolve that focus on the practical side of enhancing maritime security through the protection of Philippine constituencies in the Kalayaan Island Group, the promotion of the securities of sea lanes, transit corridors, borders and the protection of our marine resources through maritime domain and situational awareness.
The challenge of China’s overwhelming power and bullying is so great.
To cohere public responses from the foreign, defense, and military offices and to prioritize modest credible defense through maritime domain capability upgrade is to contribute to the consolidation of our defense position in the West Philippine Sea.
 
Alma Maria O. Salvador is Assistant Professor of Political Science of the Ateneo de Manila University.