To Take A Stand
By Rafael M. Alunan III
I’m directing this column to our national and local leaders whose duty is to defend the country, protect the people, and secure our natural resources. There’s a need to adapt mindsets to a deteriorating security situation in the South China Sea — fueled by China’s spurious claims of “indisputable sovereignty” over this vital body of water — by thinking, speaking, and acting as one united leadership to confront the external and internal threats to our national security.
China’s “people’s war” has been applying its “cabbage strategy” utilizing three layers to occupy the SCS, and key features in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of littoral nations, like the Philippines and Vietnam. It calls for surrounding a contested area with swarms of blue hulls (Chinese Maritime Militia, or CMM, masquerading as fishing vessels) backed up by white hulls (China Coast Guard [CCG]) and gray hulls (warships in the People’s Liberation Army Navy [PLAN]), such that the targeted area is essentially like a morsel wrapped in layers of cabbage.
The CMM is a subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization to perform basic support duties. Its coercive activities adhere to China’s broader military doctrine stating that “confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives.” It trains alongside the PLAN and CCG in military garb with rifles and bayonets. It’s based in Sansha City in the Paracels Islands and is equipped with purpose-built trawlers with reinforced hulls for ramming and sophisticated communications suites for spying. It is a fast response unit used to confront any threat to its imagined claims. (See the writings of Andrew S. Erickson, Professor of Strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute).
Commissar of the Hainan Armed Forces Department Xing Jincheng has been quoted as saying that the CMM is responsible for conducting “sovereignty operations” and defending China’s “ancestral seas” — defined as territorial waters belonging to China since ancient times — to ensure combat readiness for the purpose of denying intruders access to its occupied areas. In 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that its claim was spurious with no legal or historical basis.
For a long time, affected littoral states failed to comprehend the role of the CMM in China’s cabbage strategy. Their coast guards, navies, or fishery protection units find it difficult to judge whether they’re facing ordinary fishermen or the CMM. And so, they act with restraint avoiding force that might result in casualties, accusations of human rights abuses, and conflict escalation. China’s taken full advantage of our restraint by pushing the envelope while evading serious confrontations as it illegally occupies more maritime territory.
The US has finally realized that the CMM is a fighting force on the front-line of China’s quest to control the seas. It’s a weapon that has operated in the shadow of plausible deniability for years. The Pentagon says the CMM is a covert fleet of fishing trawlers engaged in “low-intensity” coercion in maritime disputes to wreak havoc in targeted areas. It’s state-organized, developed and controlled, operating under a direct military chain of command.
The CMM harassed the USNS Impeccable in 2009; were involved in the 2011 sabotage of two Vietnamese hydrographic vessels, and the 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal; repelled Vietnamese vessels near a Chinese oil rig in disputed waters in 2014; and shadowed the USS Lassen during a freedom-of-navigation operation (FONOPS) in 2015. In 2016, hundreds of CMM vessels supported by CCG ships were also dispatched to the Senkaku Islands and engaged Japan’s CG in ramming duels.
The CMM has swarmed the area around Pagasa Island within its territorial limit of 12 nautical miles (22 kilometers). Hundreds were spotted over a period of six months this year. Because we lack the assets to confront, disrupt, and overcome, all we’ve been able to do is monitor and report their movements. One of China’s artificial island fortresses — Subi Reef — is just 26 kilometers away from Pagasa Island (or Thitu Island), home to about 100 civilians and soldiers.
Their creeping siege tactics have also been felt in other reefs and shoals: the regime of islands in the Kalayaan Island Group or KIG (Pagasa plus eight other features); Ayungin Shoal, where the BRP Sierra Madre is; Recto Bank, which is rich in natural resources; Mischief Reef, which was forcibly grabbed from us in 1994 and now has an exclusion security zone; and Panatag (or Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal).
On June 9, a CMM vessel with hull number 42212 deliberately rammed a fishing boat from Mindoro in the Recto Bank area and ran away without lifting a finger to save them. Outraged Filipino citizens, local and national officials, and the military have condemned it as well as its brazenness to downplay the incident, deny the accusations and, worse, alter the narrative to make them appear innocent and blameless. Its hostile intent demands that we unite in condemning the crime; take diplomatic, information and legal action; and move for a multilateral security force to deter the CMM in the EEZs of victimized countries.
Because China uses a three-ring offensive to occupy, deny access and eventually conquer an area through its CMM, CCG, and PLAN, we too must apply a layered defense in the West Philippine Sea. First, the local governments should contribute to a common fund to build 200-foot steel-hulled fishing trawlers or acquire reconditioned ones from abroad — at least 100 vessels with armed maritime CAFGUs (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units) aboard and placed under the Philippine Coast Guard’s operational control. Second, we need to acquire more interdiction vessels for our Coast Guard and Navy to back them up. Third, we need to invest more in a force mix of manned aircraft and unmanned sea-air attack drones.
China’s using means not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Modern warfare, as redefined by China’s unrestricted war doctrine, includes unarmed means like cyber warfare and ramming to achieve desired outcomes. We must push for the amendment of the MDT to cover the gray areas and close the gaps. This is a litmus test for America’s declared resolve to keep the South China Sea free from the control of any one nation. It will test its “iron-clad agreement” with the Philippines to immediately respond to any armed attack to its military and other public vessels.
Rafael M. Alunan III served in the cabinet of President Corazon C. Aquino as Secretary of Tourism, and in the cabinet of President Fidel V. Ramos as Secretary of Interior and Local Government.
