A separate AFP Reserve Command
The doctrines of joint operations and combined arms require synergies across all service branches, operating units, and the “total force” consisting of the regular forces and the reserves. That desired synergy requires many dynamic factors — mindsets that drives attitudes and behavior, on and off the battlefield; leadership; training; equipage — working in sync to make it happen. That’s what separates professionals from substandard forces.
Reservists are force multipliers to complete the total force for peacetime, natural calamities, or armed conflicts. They bring with them skills needed by the Armed Forces already honed by their private sector jobs — pilots, engineers, IT, doctors, teachers, etc. And because they’re gainfully employed they’re an economical component. Whatever ranks and medals they get are motivational and don’t threaten the careers of the regulars in any way. Expenses shouldered by the Armed Forces are for mobilization, training exercises, combat clothing and individual equipment (CCIE), and annual active duty training (AADT) allowances.
Today’s reservists are receiving interoperable training for modern and unconventional war fighting. That should include participation in war games, including Balikatan, to give them a “real feel” of what it could be like.
Maximizing the utilization of the regular forces for war fighting requires that they be trained to take over garrison duties, man detention centers and POW camps, conduct military police operations and security patrols, and manage operations centers, support services and drone facilities to improve intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
Reservists are civilian in character and military in orientation. That makes them perfectly suited for Civil-Military Operations (CMO). Civic action, humanitarian assistance, search-rescue, civil affairs, logistics, intelligence, information, communications, investigation, and R&D are specific examples of their worth to the armed forces. Boosting morale and welfare requires legal, medical, housing, and public relations expertise that reservists could also effectively deliver.
The Self-Reliance Defense Program (SRDP) is another area for jointness requiring public-private sector collaboration at the local and national strata to provide the policy and working environment for the establishment of defense industrial parks — one each for air, ground, sea, space, and AI. The private sector’s networks, R&D, innovation culture, technical skills, situational awareness, and risk management are crucial for building credible deterrence, sourcing funds for acquisition, and providing for asset sustainment. Technology transfers from joint ventures are equally vital to attain a self-reliant posture.
In my younger years, I served as Division Commander of the 131st Infantry Standby Reserve Division (131SRES) and the 9th Infantry Ready Reserve Division (9IDRR), Philippine Army. The highest rank at that time that a Reserve Officer could have for that position was Colonel. In the regular forces, a division commander holds a two–star rank of Major General. Today, after an adjustment in rank was implemented in 2010, the highest rank accorded a Reservist is Brigadier General.
The 131SRES was under Army Reserve Command (ARESCOM), and its Area of Responsibility (AOR) was the National Capital Region (NCR). The 9IDRR was designated a combat support unit under the control of the Commanding General Philippine Army (CGPA), and had NCR plus Region 3 for its AOR. As a light infantry division, it had two brigades of three battalions each, in addition to the Division’s headquarters units, with more or less an authorized strength of 5,000.
Eighty-percent of the 9IDRR were volunteers from other reserve units; 20% were organic Army personnel. Basic training of new recruits was provided by ARESCOM. Retraining was done by the First Scout Ranger Regiment. The personnel of the Engineer Battalion were seconded by Triple A contractors and were trained by the Army’s 51st Engineering Brigade. We aspired to have every Rainbow Warrior become a marksman, with the end in view of effectively pinning down and degrading the enemy to enable regular forces to maneuver towards them.
The average age of the Reserve Force today is probably around 46 years old. That’s a disturbing indicator that fewer Filipinos are interested in the defense of the country. In recent times, the AFP has revved up its civil relations by scaling up its awareness and recruitment programs. High profile personalities are joining the Reserves of various AFP service branches, and the Philippine Coast Guard. Patriotism and service to the nation are being hyped. With younger volunteers, the average age could go down to 35 or less.
In that regard, I favor the return of mandatory Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and Basic Citizen’s Military Training (BCMT) to increase the numbers of Ready Reserves as well as infuse younger blood into the pool. I also favor a two-year mandatory military service program for all the right reasons, like Israel’s or Singapore’s or Switzerland’s. All that to have an ever-ready Total Force for credible deterrence.
Unfortunately, old habits and mindsets die hard. The chasms that divide the regulars and the reserves — superiority and insecurity — have not been bridged. Reserves are, inexplicably, still looked upon as inferior. It’s threatening the concepts of “jointness” and “total force.” The best recourse is to have a separate AFP Reserve Command that would focus on mobilization, training, CPX and FTX, and supply the personnel needs of the Unified Commands.
The armed forces should be the exemplars of unity, solidarity and teamwork. The victorious defense and security of the nation depend on it. The advantages of a “total force” are worthless, however, if discriminatory and belittling mindsets, attitudes, and behavior of regulars towards reservists persist.
Total force is about inclusion, not exclusion. It’s about precise human engineering where the pieces fit perfectly for the machine to function and perform as expected. Total force is what joint operations (in war and peace) and combined arms are all about. It needs enablers, not disablers. It needs professional execution, not lip service to spell the difference between victory and defeat.
It will take enlightened leadership to bring the armed forces to a state of “jointness” grounded on inclusivity, where any serial number-bearing individual is no longer distinguishable, as either regular or reservist, but as a defender of the State and a soldier of the Filipino people.
Rafael M. Alunan III is a former Secretary of Interior and Local Government and chairs the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations.


