Dynasties and the flood of corruption

“The Philippines is the political dynasty capital of the world,” then-Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago declared in her explanatory note to The Anti-Political Dynasty Act, a bill “prohibiting the establishment of political dynasties,” submitted to the 15th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines in 2019.

A report by the United Nations Development Programme states that of the 77 Philippine provinces included in their study, 72 provinces or 94% had political families (ABS-CBN News, July 2).

The 1987 Constitution, Article 2, Section 26 provides: The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. “…As may be defined by law” has been the escape clause that allowed the political dynasty-dominated Philippine legislature to evade enacting the implementing law that will finally and truly establish the explicit prohibition in the constitution against political dynasties in our society. It has been 38 years since the Constitution was made. More than 30 anti-political dynasty bills have been filed in Congress, but none have become law.

Then-president Rodrigo Duterte openly jeered in a public speech in Batangas in April, 2022 that “Nothing will happen… as Congress won’t pass an enabling law to prohibit political dynasties because majority of its members are part of these dynasties and passing such law would spell doom for their political families” (factsfirstph-partners rappler.com).

The May 2025 mid-term election campaign confirmed Duterte’s painful taunt that political dynasties are determined to stay in power. The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) underscored the dominance of a system where power is frequently passed down within families, raising concerns about its impact on democratic representation and political diversity. In addition to the Marcos-Romualdez clans of Ilocos Norte and Leyte there were about two dozen political dynasties seeking to occupy at least five seats each after the May elections.

Cited were: the Singsons of Ilocos Sur; the Hataman-Sallimans of Basilan; the Ortegas of La Union; the Dys of Isabela; the Tulfos, Pacquiaos of South Cotabato and Sarangani; Dutertes of Davao City; the Villar family of Las Piñas; the Abaloses of Mandaluyong; the Revillas and Tolentinos of Cavite; the Ejercitos of Laguna and San Juan City; the Khos of Masbate; the Ynareses of Rizal; the Khonghuns of Zambales; the Duranos of Cebu; the Dimaporos of Lanao Del Norte; the Alonto-Adiongs of Lanao Del Sur; the Ampatuans and Masturas of Maguindanao; and the Tans of Sulu.

PCIJ subsequently posted the success of the political dynasties in the May elections: 71 out of 82 winning governors in the midterm elections were members of political families. About 58 ruling clans retained control of provincial leadership, while eight members of rival political clans lost. Four other governors-elect will replace sitting dynastic governors who either allied with them or did not field a family member to keep their post. Rival dynasties took down ruling clans in at least eight provinces.

The PCIJ counted at least 18 “obese” dynasties in the mid-term elections. A thin dynasty is one in which a political clan is able to manipulate one elected position over time; a fat dynasty is one in which a political clan holds multiple government positions simultaneously, as defined by the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR). A political dynasty with five or more clan members active in politics may be called an “obese” dynasty, as defined by the PCIJ.

Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU) School of Government Dean Ronald U. Mendoza said that over four decades of being voted into positions, political dynasties turned from largely “thin” to “fat” and “obese,” growing by at least 1% or about 170 positions every election period. The PCIJ warns how political dynasties perpetuate themselves in power and expand their influence by employing different tactics that are repeated in varying degrees in provinces, districts, cities, and municipalities. They sought higher positions and swapped roles with family members and allies. They established residency in new jurisdictions and got elected there. They joined the party-list race.

Political dynasties have been blamed for worsening corruption in the Philippines. According to the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), “political dynasties breed corruption and ineptitude… because political power is monopolized by political dynasties” (Gulf News, Jan. 30, 2013). The dominance of powerful families has also allowed politicians facing corruption charges to get elected to public office. Plunder, bribery, unmerited government contracts, or misallocation of funds can be brazenly committed with impunity, because of the political dynasties’ control over the bureaucracy and the regulatory and justice system. The power and clout of the political dynasty is just too temptingly inherent not to be felt and taken to advantage by corrupt politicians.

And that is the reason why the people are now protesting about political dynasties — systemic corruption and blatant abuse of power by strongly entrenched politicians have literally flooded the collective consciousness leading to disillusionment with the “strong men” they have elected.

ELECTIONS, IMPEACHMENT, AND ARREST
The national elections on May 9, 2022 were “not free, honest, or fair by international standards,” according to the International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (ICHRP). The Philippine Election 2022 International Observer Mission (IOM) commissioned by the ICHRP had over 60 observers from 11 countries on the ground, who meticulously documented the campaign, the vote, and the aftermath of the election. “The observers reported that the May elections showed a higher level of failure of the electronic voting system than ever before, along with a higher level of blatant vote-buying, a disturbing level of red-tagging of candidates and parties, as well as a number of incidents of deadly violence. A large number of voters did not get to cast their vote, and many had to trust that election officials would later put their marked ballot paper through a Vote Counting Machine, thus undermining the secrecy of the vote,” said Lee Rhiannon, former Australian Senator and Commissioner of the IOM.

On Nov. 3, 2022, former acting secretary of the Department of Information and Communications Technology Eliseo Rio, Jr., former Commission on Elections (Comelec) commissioner Gus Lagman, and ex-FINEX president Franklin Ysaac, filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the Philippines, wherein they alleged that in the May 9, 2022 presidential election, it was “highly improbable if not impossible” for Comelec to have been able to count over 20 million votes reported within one hour (7 to 8 p.m.) of the poll precincts’ closing. Nothing came of their petition, and electoral changes recommended to the Comelec have not been taken up.

And so, the Filipino people are not even sure, up to now, if the public officials the majority wanted to elect are indeed the ones sitting in offices of power and influence over life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

On Feb. 5 this year, 215 members of the House of Representatives signed an impeachment complaint against Vice-President Sara Duterte on charges that include corruption, plotting to assassinate President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, involvement in extrajudicial killings, and incitement to insurrection and public disorder. House Secretary General Reginald Velasco said that an additional 25 law makers had signed documents, adding their names in support of the impeachment complaint, bringing the total number of signees to 240.

On June 9, minority senators Risa Hontiveros and Koko Pimentel attempted to formally start the senate impeachment trial of Ms. Duterte. The Senate delayed and decided after to archive the impeachment articles following the Supreme Court’s nullification of the complaint based on the “one year-bar rule” already covered by the first three impeachment cases, rendering the fourth one invalid. The complaint is remanded back to the House of Representatives, who have to wait until Feb. 6, 2026, one year after the original complaint, to impeach the vice-president.

But perhaps the ugliest blight and heaviest cross on the Duterte dynasty is the arrest of former president Rodrigo Duterte by the Philippine National Police and Interpol on March 11, under an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant charging him with crimes against humanity related to the Philippine drug war. He is now in The Hague, Netherlands, detained and awaiting trial. It all started with a 77-page document to the ICC titled “The Situation of Mass Murder in the Philippines,” submitted by Filipino lawyer Jude Sabio in 2017, before Rodrigo Duterte unilaterally withdrew the Philippines from ICC in 2019.

The ICC mentions nine other co-perpetrators of Rodrigo Duterte whose names are redacted in a document. Lawyer Harry Roque said that former police chief Ronald dela Rosa could be among them, along with four other police heads, the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported on March 19. The Philippine government states it will serve future warrants for the ICC if such are conveyed through Interpol.

FLOOD CONTROL
In the rising heat of public disappointment and anger with corruption and crime in government, President Marcos, Jr. in his fourth State of the Nation Address (SONA) on July 28, vowed to improve flood control projects, to lessen the hazards to life and damage to property caused by the typhoons and monsoon rains of the season. He ordered the release of a complete list of flood control projects from the past three years for public scrutiny.

On Aug. 11, he revealed initial audit findings that P100 billion, or around 20% of the Marcos administration’s flood control project expenditures, went to only 15 contractors. News agencies exposed flagged projects collectively worth more than P350 billion which did not specify the exact flood control structure built or repaired, as well as several projects at different locations which disclosed identical designs and materials.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee launched a motu proprio investigation (shown live) into alleged irregularities in flood control projects. Ghost projects were revealed. Contractors rated triple-A or quadruple-A “leased” their license to smaller builders for a fee, a practice linked to substandard construction output. Senators alleged that a small group of contractors had cornered contracts worth around P100 billion, raising concerns over competition and transparency. Mr. Marcos revealed that only 15 out of 2,409 of the accredited contractors were awarded P100 billion, or 18% of the entire P545.6-billion flood mitigation budget allocated by his administration from July 2022 to May 2025.

Senator Erwin Tulfo, the vice-chairperson of the Blue Ribbon Committee, described the P545.6-billion flood control program as “a grand robbery,” claiming that kickbacks and commissions as high as 25% left only 30-40% of funds for actual construction. Greenpeace estimates are that up to P1.089 trillion was potentially lost to corruption since 2023, with P560 billion in 2025 alone, based on figures revealed at the Senate inquiries.

The saddest, and most angering revelations, or at least suspicions so far, are that people in government — senators, congressmen, local government officials, department secretaries and their staff — are complicit with, and personally benefit from this systemic corruption. Powerful political families, or dynasties, have been accused of manipulating government contracts for public works like flood control projects.

On July 18, Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan filed a Senate bill seeking to prohibit political dynasties in the country — banning individuals related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity from holding or running for public office simultaneously.