Why PHL’s strategic partnership with Japan is crucial for its emerging middle power role in the region

Under the direction of President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., the Philippines navigates a complex strategic environment by implementing a comprehensive vision through the National Security Policy (2023–2028), which outlines the strategies for the Philippines to achieve an “aspiring middle power” role in the region.

Emmers and Teo (2018) discuss how a middle-power approach to security involves self-identification and external states shaping that identity. This suggests that a state can exercise agency even with limited resources and influence for the Philippines.

Two concerns are addressed in this essay: How may the Philippines seek to fulfill its ambition to become a middle power in the Indo-Pacific region? Second, how can such an approach achieve self-reliance and regional stability simultaneously?

BALANCED FOREIGN POLICY
Through its security policy, the Philippines participates in US-led identity-based strategizing, recognizing that ASEAN centrality extends to the larger Indo-Pacific region.

Intended to protect sea lanes of communication, the Indo-Pacific framework highlights the formation of new geopolitical coalitions around the QUAD (made up of Australia, Japan, India, and the US) and AUKUS (Australia, the US, and the UK). Its main objective is to counter China’s revisionism, while China aims to advance an alternative normative order. This development raises concerns among many, particularly in light of China’s rejection of the Indo-Pacific framework.

Against this background, the Philippine security policy also asserts that ASEAN centrality remains a “regional norm” in the Asia-Pacific region, crucial for economic integration and managing regional stability.

This purposeful positioning of ASEAN centrality on two distinct frameworks demonstrates the Philippines’ attempt at a balanced foreign and security policy stance.

MIDDLE POWER ALIGNMENT: ‘COUNTRY OF CHOICE’
The Philippines’ approach of “integrating with allies,’” as stipulated in the security policy, creates an opportunity for the country to achieve some autonomy from the risks associated with the US alliance. This is exemplified by the evolution of the strategic cooperation between the Philippines and Japan. The reflexivity of bilateral relations is evident in its history, especially in how both sides opted to define and react to China’s rise. Because it had development assistance components, partnering with Japan also contributed to lessening the Philippines’ economic dependency on China.

Stephen Nagy (2022) argues that the process of forging partnerships with like-minded states, such as Japan (and Australia), helps strengthen the Philippines’ “ability to cooperate,” which is essential for achieving “middle power alignment” or the diplomatic outreach that middle powers undertake to respond to fast-shifting regional dynamics. Taking a non-military approach to ensure regional stability has been a distinct part of Philippine-Japan relations since the 20th century.

They have been marked by a practical and cooperative approach to enhancing maritime security and addressing the threat of China and other threats to peace in the southeast-northeast Asian region.

During the early 2000s, Japan and the Philippines pursued confidence-building initiatives centered around counterterrorism and non-nuclear proliferation. As their threat perceptions converged, Japan shifted towards a more focused approach to maritime security, including capacity building of the Philippine Coast Guard, training in counterterrorism, and search and rescue operations. With the sealing of relations towards strategic partnership in 2012, their joint efforts concentrated on law enforcement training in territorial waters, bolstering maritime domain awareness, sharing information, combating piracy, ensuring environmental protection, and addressing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). On the side of the Philippines, this entailed decisions to socialize the defense and military establishments outside the US sphere and towards Japan’s high-level defense exchanges.

By the 21st century, practical cooperation has deepened through port visits, naval exercises, and equipment transfer to build the Philippines’ surveillance, monitoring, and interoperability capabilities, eventually creating a community of practice in maritime security. These actions sowed the groundwork for a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the Philippines and Japan or Japanese access to Philippine bases.

PHILIPPINES DEFENSE NETWORKS
Given the context of the US rivalry with China, the Philippines’ geopolitical significance has made it an attractive partner for major and middle powers. As a player for regional stability, the Philippines’ location in the South China Sea, along with the East China Sea, forms a “single littoral” on which northeast Asia’s peace is contingent.

Thus, the Philippines aims to maximize its defense networks and views the revitalized Philippines-US alliance as its most vital asset to do so (The Lowy Institute, 2023). With an elevated partnership with Japan, the Philippines can realign with other states, such as the planned US-Japan-Philippines trilateral cooperation. Combined with the modernization of the Philippine Armed Forces, these efforts contribute to building minimum credible deterrence.

CONCLUSION
As the Philippines navigates the complexities of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical landscape, its collaboration with Japan becomes pivotal in advancing its aspirations for regional significance.

By leveraging the strengths of this strategic partnership, the Philippines is well-positioned to play a more substantial role as an emerging middle power.

Alma Maria O. Salvador, PhD is an associate professor of political science at Ateneo de Manila University.